Yes.
A multisig can absolutely continue to work even if one signer refuses to sign, as long as the required approval threshold is still met.

This is not a bug or an edge case. This is the entire reason multisig wallets exist.

When a multisig wallet is created using platforms like Safe, you define two things up front.
Who the owners are.
How many approvals are required for a transaction to execute.

That second number is everything.

If your multisig is set up as two of three and one signer refuses to participate, the other two can still approve transactions and move funds. The multisig continues to operate normally. Nothing is blocked.

If your multisig is three of five and two people go silent or disagree, the remaining three can still move forward. Again, no issue.

This is intentional design. Multisig wallets are built to handle disagreements, delays, and even bad actors without freezing the treasury.

Where problems arise is when teams choose thresholds that are too tight.

In a two of two setup, if one signer refuses to sign, the wallet is effectively frozen. No transactions can be executed. That is not a technical failure. That is a governance choice that comes with real consequences.

This is why experienced teams rarely use two of two for anything holding real value. It looks simple, but it creates a deadlock risk that shows up at the worst possible time.

Disagreements between signers are normal. People go on vacation. Advisors disengage. Relationships change. Multisig wallets assume this will happen and give you tools to manage it, but only if you configure them correctly.

Another important detail is that refusal to sign is not permanent power. If the threshold can still be met, the remaining signers can submit a multisig transaction to remove or replace the unresponsive signer. That action itself must be approved by the multisig, which keeps the process transparent and controlled.

This is governance in action, not chaos.

It is also worth calling out that multisig interfaces are very explicit. When a transaction is waiting on signatures, you can see exactly who has signed and who has not. There is no ambiguity. Everyone knows where things stand.

The real lesson here is not about technology. It is about decision making.

A well designed multisig assumes that someone will eventually refuse to sign. It plans for that scenario. A poorly designed multisig pretends it will never happen.

If your treasury setup cannot tolerate one signer saying no, then your setup is fragile by definition.

Multisig is not about trust. It is about designing systems that continue to function when trust is tested.